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Trial Practice and Procedure

by John O'Shea Sullivan"
and Ashby L. Kent**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2006 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relating to federal trial practice and
procedure, many of which involved issues of first impression. This
Article analyzes several recent developments in the Eleventh Circuit,
including significant rulings in the areas of class actions, subject matter
jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, judicial estoppel, civil procedure,
and other issues of interest to the trial practitioner.
II.

CLASS ACTION PRACTICE UNDER THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ("CAFA") 1

A. Determining Which Party Should Bear the Burden of Proofin
Establishing CAFA's "Local Controversy"Exception to Federal Subject
Matter Jurisdiction

In Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.,2 the Eleventh Circuit held, as a
matter of first impression in all circuits, that the party seeking remand
bears the burden of proof if it seeks to avail itself of any express
statutory exception to federal jurisdiction, such as the "local controversy"

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2000 (Phi Beta Kappa)); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., with honors, 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).
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exception, granted under CAFA. 3 The court further concluded that the
sixty-day period within which the court must complete all action on an
appeal, including rendering judgment, begins to run on the date when
the appellate court grants the appellant's application to appeal, not the
date on which the application for appeal was filed.4
The plaintiffs filed this putative class action in Alabama state court,
asserting property damage and personal injury claims against numerous
defendants who operated manufacturing facilities in Anniston, Alabama.
The plaintiffs attributed their alleged injuries to the defendants' release
of various waste substances over an approximately eighty-five-year
period.5 After certain defendants removed the case under CAFA, the
plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the case fell within CAFA's
"local controversy" exception to federal jurisdiction because more than
two-thirds of the plaintiff class were Alabama citizens, and at least one
Alabama defendant was a "significant" defendant within the meaning of
CAFA.8 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama agreed and remanded the case to state court. The removing
defendants appealed.7
Before reaching the merits of the appeal, the court first had to
interpret CAFA's sixty-day rule governing the review of remand orders
to determine when its ruling on the appeal would be due.? If the circuit
court accepts an appeal, CAFA requires the court to complete all action
on the appeal, including rendering judgment, within sixty days from the
date "'on which such appeal was filed.'" 9 The court concluded that an
appeal should be deemed "filed," and the sixty-day period should thus
begin to run, on the date the court grants the application to appeal,
noting that CAFA provides for an "application," rather than a "notice"
of appeal.'0 The court also noted the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)-

3. Id. at 1164. "Congress enacted CAFA on February 18, 2005. Under CAFA, federal
courts now have original jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000,000 and there is minimal diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant
are from different states)." Id. at 1163 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (2006)).
4. Id. at 1162-63.
5. Id. at 1161.
6. Id. CAFA's "local controversy" exception provides a narrow exception to federal
jurisdiction for cases that are "truly local in nature" and requires a court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a class in which more than two-thirds of the putative class
members are citizens of the forum state and at least one defendant, whose alleged conduct
forms a significant basis for the putative plaintiffs' claims, is also a citizen of the forum.
Id. at 1163 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)).
7. Id. at 1161.
8. Id. at 1162.
9. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c) (2006)).
10. Id. at 1162-63 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1)).
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(2), which indicated that the sixty-day period should begin after the
"appeal was filed," not after the "application" was filed. 1 The court
further concluded that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5,12 which
governs discretionary appeals, could apply to requests for appeals under
CAFA and provides that "[t]he date when the order granting permission
to appeal is entered serves as the date of the notice of appeal for
[purposes of] calculating time .... ."' Accordingly, the court held that
the sixty-day period begins to run from "the date that the court of
appeals accepts the appeal, and thus file[d] the appeal." 4
Having determined its deadline under CAFA's sixty-day rule,15 the
court then addressed whether the case fell within CAFA's "local
controversy" exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction." Because
CAFA's language and structure contemplated broad federal jurisdiction
over class actions, the court emphasized that statutory exceptions should
be construed narrowly so as not to create "jurisdictional loophole[s]." 7
Determining that "[n]o other Circuit appears to have addressed the
specific question of which party should bear the burden of proof on
CAFA's local controversy exception," the court addressed "as a question
of first impression the issue of who bears the burden of proving the local
controversy exception, once the removing defendants have proved the
amount in controversy and the minimal diversity requirement, and thus
have established federal court jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2)." 8 The
court noted that CAFA did "not change the traditional rule that the
party seeking to remove the case bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction," 9 but it affirmed the district court's finding that the
plaintiffs, who sought remand under CAFA's local controversy exception,

11. Id. at 1162 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(2)).
12. FED. R. APp. P. 5.
13. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 5).
14. Id. at 1162-63. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit "agree[d] with the resolution of
every other court of appeals which has ruled on this issue." Id. at 1163 (citing Patterson
v. Dean Morris, LLP, 444 F.3d 365,367 (5th Cir. 2006); Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1390 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also
Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005).
15. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1163 ("In this case, the appellants filed their application for
appeal on March 24, 2006, and this court granted their application on March 30, 2006.
Therefore, this court's ruling is due within 60 days of March 30, 2006.").
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1163-64 (citing S. REP. No. 109-14, at 39 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37).
18. Id. at 1165.
19. Id. at 1164, 1165 (citing Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 44849 (7th Cir. 2005); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam)).
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should bear the burden of proving that the case falls within this narrow
exception.2"
In the absence of any precedent in the CAFA context, the Eleventh
Circuit looked to its prior holdings that addressed the removal of actions
involving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").2
In
those instances, the court held that once the FDIC met the statutory
prerequisites for removal, the burden of establishing the statutory "state
action" exception to federal jurisdiction shifted to the party objecting to
removal.2 2 Comparing CAFA's "local controversy" exception to the
statutory framework at issue in the FDIC cases, the court held that the
plaintiffs, as the parties objecting to removal after the prerequisites for
removal jurisdiction under CAFA had been met, bore the burden of
proving that their case fell within the local controversy exception. 3
B. Removing Defendant Bears Burden of EstablishingFederal
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under CAFA
In Miedema v. Maytag Corp.,24 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, which had "not[ed] the existence of disagreement among courts
as to which party bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction under CAFA," but "adhered to the traditional rule in the
CAFA context that a removing defendant bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction."25 The court further concluded that
CAFA did not change federal courts' long-standing practice of construing
removal statutes strictly and resolving all doubts in favor of remand.26
The plaintiff, Leslie Miedema, filed suit against Maytag Corporation
("Maytag") in Florida state court on behalf of herself and a putative class
of "'[aill purchasers of Maytag ranges/ovens, in the State of Florida,
bearing [certain model numbers].'""
Miedema alleged that various
ranges and ovens designed and manufactured by Maytag contained a
defective door latch assembly that allowed heat to escape and damage

20. Id. at 1164-65.
21. Id. at 1164 (citing Castleberry v. Goldone Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785 (11th Cir.
2005); Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991), superseded by statute, 12
U.S.C. § 1819 (2000) (analogy to Evans not affected)).
22. Id. (citing Castleberry, 408 F.3d at 785; Lazuka, 931 F.2d at 1538).
23. Id. at 1165. Under the facts at issue, the court determined that the plaintiffs had
not met this burden and thus failed to prove that their case fell within the "local
controversy" exception. Id. at 1168.
24. 450 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
25. Id. at 1325.
26. See id. at 1328-31.
27. Id. at 1324-25.
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other range and oven components.28 Maytag removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under
CAFA, alleging that Miedema and Maytag were of diverse citizenship
and the putative class consisted of thousands of Floridians, making the
amount in controversy exceed $5 million.29 Miedema moved to remand,
arguing that Maytag had the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and that30 Maytag had
failed to do so with respect to the amount in controversy.
"[N]oting the existence of disagreement among courts as to which
party bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA," the district court ordered additional briefing on this issue to help
determine whether the amount in controversy requirement had been
satisfied. 31 After receiving the additional submissions, the district
court "adhered to the traditional rule in the CAFA context that a
removing defendant bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction. 32 Acknowledging that the breadth of Miedema's complaint contributed to the uncertainty surrounding the amount in
controversy, the district court nonetheless held that Maytag had not met
its burden and that it was required to resolve all doubts in favor of
remand. Maytag petitioned for permission to appeal the remand order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). 3 3
Before addressing the merits of Maytag's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
recalled its holding in Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.3 4 regarding the
timeliness of Maytag's application for appeal under CAFA."5 The court
noted that CAFA permits a court of appeals to accept an application to
appeal if the application is made to the appellate court "'not less than 7
days after entry of the [district court's] order' granting or denying a
motion to remand." 36 Acknowledging that it had not directly addressed

28. Id. at 1324.
29. Id. at 1325 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453(a), (b) (2006)).
30. Id. In support of its argument regarding the amount in controversy, Maytag
submitted a declaration by its information analyst that declared she had researched the
range and oven models identified in Miedema's description of the putative class; that the
number of ranges and ovens bearing the alleged model numbers had been sold to nearly
7000 Floridians; and that the total value of those ranges and ovens exceeded $5 million.

Id.
31. Id. Miedema deposed Maytag's information analyst and submitted her deposition
as further evidence that Maytag could not meet its burden with respect to the amount in
controversy. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1325-26.
34. 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).
35. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326.
36. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1)).
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CAFA's seven-day application rule, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
several circuits had declined to read the "not less than" language
literally, finding it to be a typographical error or that a literal reading
would produce an absurd result."
Reaffirming the construction of
8 the court held that
§ 1453(c)(1) that it had taken in Evans,"
Maytag's
application for appeal was timely because it was made within seven days
of the district court's remand order.3 9
Turning to the merits of Maytag's appeal, the court rejected Maytag's
claim that the district court erred by applying the traditional rule that
the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction in the CAFA context.4 ° Although Maytag conceded that
CAFA's text does not address which party has the burden of proof in
establishing federal jurisdiction, Maytag argued that CAFA's legislative
history "expresses a clear intent to require that an objecting plaintiff
demonstrate removal was improvident, i.e., that all applicable jurisdictional requirements were not met."4 Maytag argued that the district
court should have placed the burden on Miedema to prove that subject
matter jurisdiction was lacking.4 2 Maytag pointed to a Senate Committee report which provided, in pertinent part, that "if a federal court is
uncertain about whether 'all matters in controversy' in a purported class
action 'do not in the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000'
the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case. " "
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Maytag, pointing to opinions from
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that had expressly rejected Maytag's
arguments."
For instance, in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc.,4 the Seventh Circuit held that "CAFA's 'naked legislative history'
[did] not alter the well-established rule that a proponent of subject
matter jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion on the amount in
controversy."4 6 In Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 47 the Ninth

37. Id. (citing Pritchett,420 F.3d at 1093 n.2 ("The statute should read that an appeal
is permissible if filed 'not more than' seven days after entry of the remand order")).
38. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162.
39. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326 ("[T]o read [§ 1453(c)(1)] literally would produce an
absurd result: there would be a front-end waiting period (an application filed 6 days after
entry of a remand order would be premature), but there would be no back-end limit (an
application filed 600 days after entry of a remand order would not be untimely")).
40. Id. at 1327-28.
41. Id. at 1328.
42. Id. at 1327-28.
43. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 40;
151 CONG. REC. H723, H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)).
44. Id. at 1328.
45. 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
46. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Brill, 427 F.3d at 448).
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Circuit held that "'CAFA's silence, coupled with a sentence in a
legislative committee report untethered to any statutory language, does
not alter the longstanding rule that the party seeking federal jurisdiction48
on removal bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction.'
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit cited its decision in Evans,4 9 which
concurred with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that "'CAFA
does not upset the traditional rule that the removing party bears the
burden of proof with regard to establishing federal court jurisdiction.'"'
The court also rejected Maytag's argument that the district court
should have resolved any doubts about the amount in controversy in
favor of finding jurisdiction.5 1 Maytag argued that adherence to these
rules ran contrary to "one of the overriding purposes" of CAFA, which
Maytag characterized as "'fixing the flaw in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and
throwing open the doors of the federal judiciary to defendants who are
sued in state court class actions.' 5 2 Although CAFA is also silent on
this issue, the court noted that the rule of construing removal statutes
strictly and resolving doubts in favor of remand remained well-established.13 The court further noted that Congress presumably legislated
against the backdrop of established principles, and could have expressly
imposed a special rule of construction on CAFA's provisions had it
wanted to alter these longstanding rules for purposes of class action
removals.54 Therefore, the court determined that Maytag's "generalized
appeals to CAFA's 'overriding purpose' are unavailing in the face of
CAFA's silence on the traditional, well-established rules that govern the
placement of the burden of proof and the resolution of doubts in favor of
remand."5 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court
did not err by placing the burden of establishing subject matter
"

47. 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
48. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686).
49. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164.
50. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164). The court further
relied on its prior opinion in United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993), which
held that " ' [w hile a committee report may ordinarily be used to interpret unclear language
contained in a statute, a committee report cannot serve as an independent statutory source
having the force of law.'" Id. at 1577 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No.
474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
51. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328.
52. Id. at 1329 (internal punctuation omitted).
53. Id. at 1328 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 1329 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 1329-30.
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jurisdiction on Maytag, the removing defendant, or by applying the
general rule that doubts are to be resolved in favor of remand. 6
C. Whether Federal or State Law Determines When an Action is
"Commenced"for Purposes of Determining the Applicability of CAFA
In Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc.,57 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed two more issues of first impression regarding CAFA: (1)
whether the court has jurisdiction to review an order remanding a case
based on a finding that CAFA did not apply and (2) what law determines
when an action has "commenced" for purposes of CAFA.5"
The plaintiff and appellant, Eufaula Drugs, Inc. ("Eufaula"), filed a
complaint against Tmesys, Inc. in Alabama state court on February 14,
2005, and summonses were not issued until February 28, 2005. Tmesys
removed the case pursuant to CAFA, and Eufaula moved to remand. 9
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
remanded the case, finding that when Eufaula "'filed its complaint on
February 14, 2005, it had the specific intent that the complaint be
served on that day."'6 0 Accordingly, the district court found that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because under Alabama law, the case
had commenced prior to CAFA's effective date of February 18, 2005.
Noting that it generally did not have jurisdiction to review remand
orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d),6 2 the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that CAFA provided it with discretionary jurisdiction to review such
orders in cases that were "commenced" on or after CAFA's enactment.6"
The court further held, as a matter of first impression, that it had
jurisdiction to review a district court's remand order when that order is
based on a determination that CAFA does not apply, at least to the
extent of re-examining that jurisdictional issue. 4 Addressing yet

56. Id. at 1330.
Further determining that Maytag had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory
minimum of $5 million as required by CAFA, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment remanding the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 133031.
57. 462 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2006).
58. Id. at 1319.
59. Id. at 1318.
60. Id. (quoting Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249 (M.D.
Ala. 2006)).
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000).
63. Tmesys, Inc., 462 F.3d at 1318-19 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1)).
64. Id. at 1319 (citing Patterson v. Dean Morris, LLP, 448 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 2006)
("We may review orders of remand for asserted errors in the application of CAFA"); Ecee,
Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 611 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e always
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another issue of first impression, the court agreed with the "consensus
among circuits" in determining that state law determines when an action
is commenced for purposes of CAFA.65 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court's application of Alabama law, which
established that the action was commenced prior to the effective date of
CAFA, thereby depriving the district court and the court of appeals of
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter under CAFA.66
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Whether The Social Security Act Permits an Award of Attorney
Fees for Past-Due Benefits Awarded to a ClaimantAfter Remand
In Bergen v. Commission of Social Security, 7 the Eleventh Circuit
held, as a matter of first impression, that the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), 5 permits an award of attorney fees when a
district court remands a case to the Commissioner of Social Security (the
"Commissioner") for further proceedings and the Commissioner
subsequently awards the claimant past-due benefits on remand.69
Section 406(b)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under
this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney,
the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable
fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of
the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of
such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may ...
certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and
not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits.70
This consolidated appeal came before the court after claimants Donald
Bergen and James Taylor (the "Claimants") filed applications with the
Social Security Administration ("SSA") for disability benefits. The
Claimants' claims were denied initially and then on reconsideration, and
they requested administrative hearings. After an Administrative Law

have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction)).
65. Id. (citing Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43,43 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Braud
v. Transp. Serv. Co. of Ill.,
445 F.3d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 2006); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d
725, 726 (7th Cir. 2005); Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2006); Bush
v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)).
66. Id.
67. 454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2000).
69. Bergen, 454 F.3d. at 1274.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
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Judge ("AM") determined that the Claimants were not entitled to
benefits because they were not disabled, they filed complaints in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking
review of the Commissioner's final decision. The Claimants were
represented by attorney Richard Culbertson under a contingency fee
agreement providing for payment of a reasonable fee not to exceed
twenty-five percent of the total past-due benefits the Claimants would
be entitled to recover if the district court entered judgment in their
favor."
The district court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded
the case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).72 Bergen then moved for
attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412
("EAJA")," and the motion was granted.7 4 An ALJ subsequently
awarded Bergen past-due benefits as a result of his disability. 75 The

district court also remanded Taylor's case after reversing the Commissioner's decision, and an AJ also awarded Taylor past-due disability
benefits. 76 However, when Culbertson filed for authorization to charge
a reasonable fee for representing the Claimants before the district court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), 77 the district court denied the petition.7" Specifically, the district court found that 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) did
not authorize an award of attorney fees because the district court's prior
judgment did not amount to a victory for the Claimants, but simply
reversed and remanded their cases to the SSA for further consideration.
Under the district court's literal interpretation of § 406(b), an award of
attorney fees was unavailable unless the district court's judgment
expressly entitled the claimant to an award of past-due benefits and
included an award of attorney fees under § 406(b). The Claimants
appealed.7 9
Acknowledging that it had never addressed the precise issue of
whether § 406(b)(1)(A) authorizes an award of attorney fees when the
district court's judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner does

71. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1274.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000); Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1274-75.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
74. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1275.
75. Id.
76. Id. Taylor also filed a petition for an award of attorney fees under the EAJA, but
the district court denied the petition on the ground that the Commissioner's position was
substantially justified. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (2000).
78. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1275.
79. Id.
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not explicitly mention attorney fees,"° the Eleventh Circuit joined "the
unanimous view of the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue
to find that § 406(b) authorizes attorney's fees where a district court
orders a remand to the Commissioner of Social Security for further
proceedings, and .the Commissioner awards benefits on remand.""
Specifically, the court held that the district court's literal reading of the
statute frustrated the congressional intent behind § 406(b), which was
in part to "'encourag[e] effective legal representation of claimants by
insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through
certification by the Secretary.'8 2 Rather, the court held that limiting
§ 406(b) fees to cases in which the court itself awards past-due benefits
would discourage counsel from requesting a remand in cases where it
was appropriate.8 " Therefore, the court agreed with its sister circuits'
interpretation of § 406(b)-that "a judgment favorable to the claimant
is merely a prerequisite to a fee award under the statute." 4
In support of this conclusion, the court cited the holding in Smith v.
Bowen, 5 in which the Seventh Circuit held that in reading the statute
as a whole:
[it did] not believe that Congress meant that the only time at which
fees could be awarded is the time of the judgment. By authorizing the
attorney to be paid directly out of the claimant's past-due benefits,
Congress intended to make it easier, not harder for attorneys to collect
their fees.8

The court also cited the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Conner v. Gardner,8 7 which held that § 406(b)(1) permits an award of attorney fees

80. Id. at 1276.
81. Id. at 1278.
82. Id. at 1277 (quoting Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1970)). The
court also noted that one of § 406(b)'s goals was to protect claimants by limiting the
amount that attorneys could collect. Id. at 1276 (citing Shoemaker v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 858,
860-61 (11th Cir. 1988)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1276 (citing Smith v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1152, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam). Contra McGraw v. Barnhart, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 (N.D. Okla. 2005) ("A
judgment which merely remands the action for further proceedings by the Social Security
Administration does not equate to a claimant being entitled to past due benefits 'by reason
of the Court's judgment"); see McPeak v. Barnhart, 388 F. Supp. 2d 742, 746 n.2 (S.D. W.
Va. 2005) ("[The McGraw court is] reading [§ 406(b)] too narrowly without considering the
sorts of judgments which Congress has allowed Courts to make in social security cases").
85. 815 F.2d 1152, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
86. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Smith, 815 F.2d at 1155).
87. 381 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1967).
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when a remand results in an administrative award of benefits.8" The
Eleventh Circuit also reasoned that it and its sister circuits had
generally assumed, without addressing the issue, that fees were
available under § 406(b) because past-due benefits had been conspicuously awarded without objection by the SSA. 9 Finally, the court noted the
Supreme Court's holding that a remand from the district court to the
SSA under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a favorable judgment for the claimant.90
The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with the district court's reasoning
that the availability of attorney fees to a successful claimant under the
subsequently enacted EAJA made § 406(b) attorney fees unnecessary. 91
Under the EAJA, fees were available only when the government's
position was not "substantially justified" and were, therefore, not
available every time a claimant prevailed on remand.9 2 Moreover, the
court noted that Congress had not amended § 406(b)(1)(A) following the
EAJA's enactment, and the Supreme Court had concluded that
"Congress harmonized awards for attorney's fees under the EAJA with
awards under § 406(b) by requiring the claimant's attorney to refund to
the claimant the amount of smaller fee."" Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that § 406(b) authorizes an
award of attorney fees when a district court orders a remand to the
Commissioner for further proceedings and the Commissioner awards
past-due benefits to the claimant on remand.94
B. Whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services May,
Pursuant to Part B of the Medicare Act, Require Suppliers of Durable
Medical Equipment to Submit Additional Proofof Medical Necessity
Even After a Certificate of Medical Necessity Has Been Submitted
The appeal in Gulfcoast Medical Supply, Inc. v. Secretary,Department
of Health & Human Services95 presented an issue of first impression in

88. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1276. The court in Bergen noted that "to permit counsel to
receive a reasonable fee for [services rendered in the district court] will not defeat
[§ 406(b)'s] purpose, but will serve to advance it." Id. (citing Conner, 381 F.2d at 500).
89. Id. at 1277 (citing McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 975 (7th Cir. 1989); Straw v.
Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1989); Shoemaker, 853 F.2d at 859-61; MacDonald
v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 144, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1975)).
90. Bergen, 454 F.3d at 1276 (citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)).
91. Id. at 1277.
92. Id. (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 & n.2 (1988)).
93. Id. (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,796 (2002)) (internal punctuation
omitted).
94. Id. at 1277-78.
95. 468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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the Eleventh Circuit and all circuit courts: whether, under the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,96 a
supplier of durable medical equipment ("DME") unequivocally establishes that such equipment is medically "reasonable and necessary," and
thus covered by Part B of the Medicare Act, by submitting a "certificate
of medical necessity," or whether the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary") can require the supplier to submit additional
evidence of medical necessity.9 7

Concluding that the Secretary was

authorized to require additional submissions, the Eleventh Circuit
affir-med the decision reached by the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.9"
Part B of the Medicare Act is a federally subsidized, voluntary
enrollment health insurance program that pays a substantial portion of
the health care costs incurred by those enrolled in the program. These
costs include the cost of DME, such as wheelchairs.9 9 Part B is
administered by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"),
a division supervised by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.100 Only those medical services that are medically "reasonable and
necessary" for the beneficiary are covered by the program.' ° '
CMS contracts with private insurance carriers who act as claims
processors that administer, validate, and pay Part B claims.' °2 The
carrier must decide "whether the claimed services 'were medically
necessary, whether the charges are reasonable, and whether the claim
is otherwise covered by Part B'" when the carrier receives a claim for
payment. 03 Medicare will not pay a claim unless a physician certifies
that the medical services were medically required.'

96. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
97. Gulfcoast, 468 F.3d at 1348. The court noted that two district courts had
addressed this issue: MacKenzie Medical Supply, Inc. v. Leavitt, 419 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D.
Md. 2006) and Maximum Comfort, Inc. v. Thompson, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (E.D. Cal.
2004). Gulfcoast, 468 F.3d at 1348 n.1.
98. Gulfcoast, 468 F.3d at 1348.
99. Id. at 1348-49 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j to 1395w-4, 1395x(n) (2000 & Supp. III
2003); 42 C.F.R. § 410.38(a)-(c) (2006)).
100. Id. at 1349 (citing United States v. R&F Props. of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d
1349, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2005)).
101. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(k)(1)
(2006)).
102. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (2000 & Supp. III 2003); R&F Properties,433 F.3d
at 1351).
103. Id. (quoting Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 191 (1982) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13951, 1395y(a); 42 C.F.R. § 405.803 (1980)).
104. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
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To facilitate claims processing, the Medicare Act permits DME
suppliers to distribute to physicians a "Certificate of Medical Necessity"
("CMN"),' 0 5 which is defined as "'a form or other document containing
information required by the carrier to be submitted to show that an item
is [medically] reasonable and necessary.'"1 "8 To reduce the administrative burden on physicians who only supply the medical information on
the CMN, suppliers are permitted to fill in certain portions of the form
in advance, including: "(1) identifying information about the supplier and
the beneficiary, (2) a description and product code for the medical
equipment supplied, and (3) other administrative information not related
to the beneficiary's medical condition.""0 7 As long as the claims do not
contain "glaring irregularities," carriers will typically authorize payment
immediately upon receipt of a claim and will later conduct a postpayment audit to verify that the payment was proper.'08 If an overpayment is discovered, the carrier may suspend or recoup the payment.10 9 A supplier may appeal a carrier's rejection of a claim through
a statutory administrative appeals process." 0 After exhausting this
administrative remedy, the supplier may seek judicial review in a
federal district court."'
Appellant Gulfcoast Medical Supply ("Gulfcoast"), a supplier of DME
which included motorized wheelchairs, had Part B claims that were
administered by Palmetto Government Benefit Administrators ("Palmetto"), a Medicare carrier. After receiving consumer complaints and
suspicious results from statistical analyses of Gulfcoast claims, Palmetto
audited Gulfcoast in June of 2002. Palmetto determined that numerous
patients for whom Gulfcoast had submitted claims for Medicare
reimbursement did not meet the necessary criteria and concluded that
Gulfcoast had been overpaid by $280,573.68. A Medicare fair hearing
officer affirmed the overpayment assessment, and Gulfcoast appealed to
an Administrative Law Judge ("AJ"), arguing that because it had
submitted a CMN signed by a physician for each of the challenged
claims, Palmetto lacked discretion to reject those claims on the basis of
requiring additional evidence. The ALJ disagreed, finding that the
audited claims reflected a pattern of erroneous billing and that

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
(2006)).
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(j)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(j)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. IH 2003)).
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(j)(2)(A)).
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395u; 42 C.F.R. § 421.200(a)(2) (2006)).
(citing 42 C.F.R. § 405.371(a) (2006)).
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. 112003); 42 C.F.R. § 405.801

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395f0lb)(1)(A)).
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overpayments were correctly assessed in a majority of the challenged
claims. Gulfcoast appealed to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, which affirmed the AIU's ruling." 2
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Gulfcoast argued that as a matter
of statutory construction, Part B did not allow carriers or the Secretary
to require a supplier to submit additional medical documentation beyond
the CMN to prove medical reasonableness and necessity."' Relying
on the statutory definition of a CMN, Gulfcoast argued that Part B
unambiguously mandated that a CMN alone establishes the reasonableness and necessity of medical equipment, and that a CMN signed by the
physician was legally sufficient to validate a claim under Plan B." 4
Gulfcoast contended that because it submitted a signed CMN for each
of the disputed claims, the Secretary lacked discretion to reject those
claims based on additional records procured or interviews conducted by
the carrier."5
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Gulfcoast and held that the
Medicare Act did not preclude the Secretary from requiring a supplier
to submit information beyond a CMN to prove medical reasonableness
and necessity."6 First, the court held that § 1395m(j)(2)(B) did not
unequivocally state that a CMN is the only documentation that may be
required to show medical necessity-it simply defined a CMN as a "form
or other document" containing information showing medical necessity." 7 The court noted Gulfcoast's failure to cite to any other section
of the Medicare Act that stated, or even suggested, that the Secretary
may not require a supplier to supplement a CMN with other documentation."
The court further noted that neither § 1395m(j)(2) nor any
other provision of the Medicare Act even required a supplier to submit
a CMN to the carrier.19 On the contrary, the court held that the

112. Id. at 1349-50.
113.

Id. at 1350.

114. Id. at 1350-51 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(j)(2)(B) (defining a CMN as "aform or
other document containing information required by the carrier to be submitted to show that
an item is reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or
to improve the functioning of a malformed body member")).
115. Id. at 1350. Gulfcoast relied on the holding in Maximum Comfort, 323 F. Supp.
2d at 1067-68 (holding that § 1395m(j)(2)(B) "plainly specifies that Congress intended that
whatever information may be required by carriers from suppliers to show the medical
necessity and reasonableness of DME must be contained in a CMN"). Gulfcoast, 468 F.3d
at 1351.
116. Gulfcoast, 468 F.3d at 1351.
117. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(j)(2)(B)).
118. Id. at 1351-52.
119. Id. at 1352. The court held that 'lilt would be incoherent to construe § 1395m(j)(2), a subsection restricting the use of CMNs and clearly indicating that they are
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auditing provisions of Part B, which "empower[ed] carriers to 'make such
audits of the records of providers of services as may be necessary to
assure that proper payments are made,'" unambiguously contemplated
the Secretary's authority to require suppliers to submit medical evidence
beyond a CMN to prove medical reasonableness and necessity. 2 ° The
Eleventh Circuit thus concluded that "when the Medicare Act is read as
a whole, it unambiguously permits carriers and the Secretary to require
suppliers to submit evidence of medical necessity beyond a CMN. "1 '
The court further held that even if the Medicare Act were ambiguous
on this issue, § 1395f(a) of the Medicare Act gave the Secretary
discretion to make determinations with respect to benefits under Part B,
and the Secretary's interpretation of this authority was permissible.' 22
Accordingly, the court concluded that "[gliven the Secretary's discretion
under § 1395ff(a), as well as the language of § 1395(m)(j)(2) and the
carriers' authority to conduct post-payment audits pursuant to § 1395(a)(1)(C), Palmetto and the Secretary acted reasonably in assuming
the
23
authority to require additional documentation from Gulfcoast."
C. Whether the FairCredit Reporting Act Requires Disclosure of the
Complete Consumer File Following a Reinvestigation of Disputed
Items of a Consumer's Credit History
The interlocutory appeal in Nunnally v. Equifax Information Services,
LLC 124 presented one issue: whether the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii), 12 5 requires a credit reporting
agency ("CRA") to provide a consumer with his or her complete file
following a reinvestigation of disputed items of the consumer's credit
history.216 Holding that the FCRA's plain language does not require
disclosure of the complete consumer file following a reinvestigation, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding "that a 'consumer
report' 7 that follows a reinvestigation refers to the consumer's 'full
12
file.'"

voluntary, to also make CMNs the exclusive means for proving medical necessity." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395m(j)(2), 1395x(n)).
120. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a)(1)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 421.200(e) (2006) (requiring that
"[t]he carrier must audit the records of providers to whom it makes Medicare Part B
payments to assure that payments are made properly")).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1352-53.
124. 451 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2006).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii) (2000).
126. Nunnally, 451 F.3d at 770.
127. Id.

2007]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1331

The FCRA requires a CRA to provide a free reinvestigation of a
consumer's file if "'the completeness or accuracy of any item of informa128
tion contained in a consumer's file.., is disputed by the consumer.''
After a reinvestigation, the CRA "'shall provide written notice to a
consumer of the results of a reinvestigation.'"'2 9 The FCRA further
provides that "'[a]s part of, or in addition to, the notice.... a consumer
reporting agency shall provide... a consumer report that is based upon
the consumer's
file as that file is revised as a result of the reinvestiga30
tion."
The plaintiffs, Leroy Nunnally, Jr., Gladys Nunnally, and Arlene M.
Rhodes, filed a putative class action in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama against Equifax Information
Services, LLC ("Equifax"), a CRA, alleging that Equifax failed to comply
with the FCRA when it did not send them each a "complete copy" of
their consumer reports following reinvestigations into disputed items of
their credit histories.13 ' Rather than sending copies of the plaintiffs'
complete consumer files, Equifax sent each of the plaintiffs letters that
reported the results of the reinvestigations and described the changes
that had been made to their consumer files. Equifax moved to dismiss,
arguing that the letters it sent to the plaintiffs complied with § 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii), which required Equifax to provide the plaintiffs with a
"consumer report. " 132 The district court denied Equifax's motion,
finding that because § 1681i(a)(6) requires that a "consumer report"
must be provided to the consumer "as part of' or "in addition to" the
notice of the results of the reinvestigation, the "consumer report" must
be the consumer's complete file, which is "something over and above the
mere results" of the reinvestigation. 13 3
To determine whether Equifax satisfied its statutory obligations to the
plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether the "consumer
report" that a CRA provides to a consumer following a reinvestigation is
the consumer's complete file or just a description of the revisions to the

128. Id. at 771 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004)).
129. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(A) (2000)).
130. Id. at 771-72 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B) (2000)).
131. Id. at 770-71 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6) (2000)). The putative class consisted
of all persons who had requested reinvestigation but had not received a "free and complete
copy" of their consumer report from Equifax following the reinvestigation. Id. at 771.
132. Id. at 770-71.
133. Id. at 771 (citing Nunnally v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1119,
1132-33 (N.D. Ala. 2005)). The district court also found that the letters Equifax sent were
excluded from the definition of "consumer report" because those letters were communications relating solely to transactions between the plaintiffs and Equifax. Id. (citing
Nunnally, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1132).
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file which were made as a result of the reinvestigation.3
Equifax
argued that no section of the FCRA required disclosure of the consumer's
complete file. Equifax also asserted that the district court erroneously
interpreted the term "consumer report" on two grounds. Equifax first
contended that the language of § 1681(i) and the definitions of "consumer report" and "file" in § 1681(a) demonstrated that a CRA was not
required to provide a consumer with his complete file following a
reinvestigation.1 3 5 Equifax then argued that other provisions of the
FCRA required a CRA to provide consumers with their complete files in
different circumstances, and that "the contrast of those provisions
support[ed] an interpretation that § 1681(i) does not require disclosure
of the consumer's complete file."' 36 In response, the plaintiffs argued
that the purpose of the FCRA requires CRAs to provide more information to consumers following a reinvestigation than Equifax provided to
the plaintiffs, and that both the text and purpose
of the FCRA supported
1 37
disclosure of the consumer's complete file.
1. The FCRA Does Not Require Disclosure of the Consumer's
Complete File After Reinvestigation. The Eleventh Circuit began
its analysis with the FCRA's definitions of the terms "consumer report"
and "file." 38 Under the FCRA, a "consumer report" is "'any written,
oral, or other communication of any information by a [CRAl bearing on
a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living.'"' 39 The definition of "consumer report" excludes "'any []report
containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between
the consumer and the person making the report.'""4
The FCRA
defines "file" as "'all of the information on that consumer recorded and
retained by a [CRA] regardless of how the information is stored.""'
Based on these definitions, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Equifax,
determining that the district court had erroneously concluded that
§ 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i)'s definition of "consumer report," which specifically
excludes "'any report containing information solely as to .ransactions or
experiences between the consumer and the person making the report,"'
excluded the type of information Equifax provided to the plaintiffs in its

134.

Id. at 772.

135. Id.
136. Id.

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000)).
140. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000)).
141. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g) (2000)).
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letters. 14 2 Because Equifax's letters to the plaintiffs provided information reported to Equifax by third parties, and did not contain information solely about Equifax's "transactions and experiences" with the
plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit held that Equifax's letters were not
excluded from the definition of a "consumer report."'"
The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with the district court's conclusion
that the language of § 1681i(a)(6)(B) required disclosure of the consumer's complete file following reinvestigation.'" Rather, the court held
that § 168li(a)(6)(B)'s language, which provided that the "consumer
report" shall be "part of, or in addition to" the written notice of the
reinvestigation, allowed a CRA two methods by which to provide the
consumer report to the consumer: "(1) as part of the written document
that is the notice of the results of the reinvestigation or (2) in a separate
document." 45 The court also agreed with Equifax's argument that
§ 168 li(a)(6)(B)'s requirement that the consumer report be "'based upon
the consumer's file as that file is revised'" established that the consumer
report following a reinvestigation was different than the consumer's
complete file.'" The court was further persuaded by Equifax's argument that the phrase "as that file is revised" does nothing more than
require the consumer report to be based on the revisions to the
consumer's file that resulted from the reinvestigation. 4 7 Thus, the
court concluded that the language of § 1681i(a)(6)(B) does not require
that a consumer report consist of the consumer's complete file.'
2. The Use of the Terms "Consumer Report" and "File" in
Other Sections of the FCRA Suggests That § 1681i Does Not
Require Disclosure of the Complete File After Reinvestigation. The Eleventh Circuit also determined that other sections of the
FCRA, which plainly referred to disclosure of a consumer's complete file
in other circumstances, supported its holding that § 1681i did not
require disclosure of the complete file after reinvestigation. 149 The

142. Id. at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 773-74.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 772-73 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 168(i)(a)(6)(B)) (emphasis omitted). "As Equifax
correctly explains, 'a report is not "based upon" the consumer's file if it is the entire file.'
To conflate the meaning of'consumer report' with Tile' would make the terms redundant."
Id. at 773.
147. Id. at 773.
148. Id. at 774.
149. Id.
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court noted that under § 1681g, 5 ° which was the FCRA's "pivotal
section regarding the disclosure of the consumer's complete file," a CRA
was required to disclose "all information in the consumer's file" upon a
consumer's request.' 5 ' Noting that Congress did not refer to § 1681g
in § 1681i's requirements for a report following a reinvestigation,
although it was cross-referenced in other sections of the FCRA,' 52 the
court concluded that Congress did not intend to require disclosure of the
consumer's complete file as the "consumer report" following reinvestigation.5'
The plaintiffs pointed to § 1681i(d),M which provides that a consumer may request the credit reporting agency "to furnish notification...
to any person specifically designated by the consumer who ...received
a consumer report ...which contained the deleted or disputed information" to support their claim that a CRA must provide the consumer's
complete file following a reinvestigation.' 55 The plaintiffs argued that
disclosure of the complete file was required because consumers would
need to "specifically designate" which persons needed to receive the
updated information, and consumers could only do so if they had been
provided with the identity
of all persons who had reviewed the
156
inaccurate information.
Disagreeing, the court determined that it was clear from other sections
of the FCRA that ordinarily a consumer would know when a third party
has reviewed an erroneous consumer report because (1) a consumer may
annually receive a free copy of his complete file which discloses all
inquiries about the consumer, and (2) the majority of circumstances in
which a consumer report may be furnished to a third party require

150. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
151. Nunnally, 451 F.3d at 774 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)).
152. Id. Specifically, the court noted that 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681j and 1681m (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004) also refer to the disclosure requirement of a consumer's complete file under 15
U.S.C. § 1681g. Nunnally, 451 F.3d at 774. For instance, § 1681(j)(a)(1)(A) requires that
all consumer reporting agencies "shall make all disclosures pursuant to section 1681g once
during any 12-month period," and the disclosure is defined as the consumer's complete file.
Id. Similarly, § 1681m required users of consumer reports that had taken adverse actions
against a consumer to notify the consumer of his right to obtain "a free copy of a consumer
report on the consumer" if the adverse action is based on information contained in the
consumer report. Id. The court noted that § 1681m states that the consumer's right to a
free consumer report is exercised under § 1681j, which cross-references § 1681g. Id.
However, these cross-references to § 1681g are not included in § 1681i, the section
concerning reinvestigations. Id.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d) (2000).
155. Nunnally, 451 F.3d at 775 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d)).
156. Id.
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notice to, or permission from, the consumer, or involve transactions in
which the consumer would know that his consumer report would be
sought.5 7 The court further noted that § 1681m required third parties
to inform consumers of any "adverse actions," as defined in § 1681a(k),158 that the third party has taken based on information contained
in the consumer report, meaning that the consumer would know that the
third party had reviewed the consumer's report.15 9 Although consumers would not know of third parties who received the inaccurate report
but took no adverse action against the consumer, the court noted that
this lone exception to the general rule involved negligible harm to the
consumer and would not justify requiring a CRA to inform consumers of
all persons who reviewed the inaccurate file in contravention of the plain
language of the FCRA. 6 °
3. The FCRA's Purpose Does Not Require Disclosure of a
Consumer's Complete File Following Reinvestigation. Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that the FCRA's purpose would be undermined by
permitting CRAs to only give a summary of the changes made as a
result of the reinvestigation. 6 ' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
the plaintiffs' assumption that more information is better and disclosure
of the complete file would better enable consumers to detect inaccuracies.162 Because the revisions may not be apparent to a consumer in
a review of his or her complete file, the court determined that the
summary letters Equifax sent highlighted the changes made to the
consumers' files and provided a simple method to determine whether
each of the contested items had been appropriately addressed. 6 '
The court further concluded that the plaintiffs' argument was contrary
to the FCRA's plain text.'
Congress stated in the FCRA what
information it considered necessary for consumers to verify the accuracy

157. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681j, 1681g(a)(3)(A), 1681b(a)(1), 1681b(a)(2), 1681b(a)(3)(B)-(D), 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i), and 1681b(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2004)).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k) (2000).
159. Nunnally, 451 F.3d at 775 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(1)).
160. Id. The court also noted that a CRA's failure to identify third parties who
requested an erroneous consumer report did not prevent the consumer from taking
advantage of the notification right in § 1681i(d). Id. For instance, following receipt of the
consumer report, the consumer could ask the credit reporting agency to notify every person
who had received an erroneous report about the corrections to the consumer's file. Id.
Such a consumer request appeared to satisfy the consumer's burden of specific designation
referred to under § 1681i(d). Id.
161. Id. at 775-76.
162. Id. at 776.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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of their complete files, and Congress had determined that a "consumer
report based on the file as that file is revised" satisfied the FCRA's purpose. 16 5 Therefore, the court held that the FCRA did not require a
disclosure of the complete consumer file following a reinvestigation, and
that Equifax had satisfied its obligation to send the plaintiffs a
"consumer report" when it informed the plaintiffs of the changes it had
made to their respective files as a result of the reinvestigations."6 The
court also held that Equifax satisfied the FCRA's notice requirement
when it informed the plaintiffs that it had reinvestigated their complaints and determined that their complaints were valid." 7 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case with instructions to grant Equifax's Motion to
Dismiss. 6
IV.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Good Faithfor Purposes of FairUse Defense in Trademark
Infringement Cases
In International Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 69
the Eleventh Circuit was required to determine, as an issue of first
impression, the appropriate legal standard for good faith with respect to
a fair use defense in a trademark infringement case. 7 ° The Eleventh
Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the legal standard is the
same as for any other trademark infringement inquiry into good
faith-that is, whether the alleged infringer intended
to benefit from the
17 1
goodwill associated with the holder of the mark.
The plaintiff and appellant, International Stamp Art, Inc. ("ISA"),
appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and
appellee, the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), with respect to the
USPS's assertion of a fair use defense in response to ISAs allegation of
trademark infringement.'72 ISA produced and sold greeting cards and
other stationery that oftentimes used a perforated border design evoking

165. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(B)).
166. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii), 1681a(d) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
167. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(A)).
168. Id.
169. 456 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
170. Id. at 1271.
171. Id. As discussed infra, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Second, Third, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal on this issue. See id. at 1274-75 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 1273.
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the functional, flat-edged perforation of the older postage stamps. 173
Since 1996 ISA's perforated border design had been federally registered
174
as a trademark for use on printed note cards and greeting cards.
Almost from its inception, ISA was a nonexclusive licensee of the
USPS, and the parties entered into a series of license agreements
between 1985 and 1997 wherein the USPS licensed use of its "stamp
designs," which included all United States postage stamps to which the
USPS owned the copyright. Images of the stamps were transmitted to
licensees on transparencies, which depicted the entire stamp (including
any perforated edges) and were marked as copyright protected. The
USPS retained rights of approval over all licensed products.
As a licensee, ISA sought to sell its products at USPS locations
nationwide and made several proposals to the USPS to that end. In the
late 1980s to the early 1990s, a few USPS stores carried ISA products.
Although the parties discussed possibly expanding such sales to USPS
stores nationwide in the mid-1990s, nothing further came of the
discussions, and the USPS did not respond to any of ISA's subsequent
proposals to handle distribution and management of ISA's products.'7 5
In the late 1990s, the USPS retail division began offering its own line
of stamp art cards, most of which included the perforated border of the
original stamp as part of the stamp's image. The USPS also occasionally
licensed or produced cards that incorporated the art depicted in its
stamps without the perforated border. Most of the USPS's stamp art
cards included the stamp's value designation and the "USA" mark as
they appeared on the stamp, but these elements did not appear in other
cards that incorporated the art but not the entire stamp image. The
USPS's choice about whether to depict entire stamp images or the
underlying stamp art alone often reflected the extent of the USPS's
ownership interests in the stamp image. In the case of jointly-owned
stamp designs in which the copyright interest in the underlying artwork
was held by another, the USPS was often limited to reproducing the
entire stamp image with all of its constituent elements (including the
"USA" mark, the price designation, and the perforated borders) because
it was not licensed to reproduce the underlying art alone.' 76

173. Id. at 1271.
174. Id. at 1272. For purposes of the appeal, both parties stipulated that the mark was
incontestable, meaning that its validity could not be challenged on the grounds that it is
merely descriptive even if the challenger showed that the mark was improperly registered
initially. Id. at 1272 n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000); Dieter v. B&H Indus. of Sw. Fla.,
Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 328 (11th Cir. 1989)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1272-73.
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In September 2002 ISA sued the USPS alleging unlawful infringement
of its perforated border mark with respect to those USPS cards depicting
the entire image of a stamp. The USPS moved for summary judgment,
arguing, among other things, that it did not use ISA's mark and that its
use of the perforated border in depicting images of its stamps fell within
the law's "fair use" exception.'17 Because a trademark is defined as
"'any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof [used]
to identify and distinguish [one's] goods. . . from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,'" in order to
prevail on a trademark infringement claim, ISA had to show that the
USPS had adopted an identical or similar mark that consumers were
likely to confuse with ISA's trademark."' v The parties stipulated that
ISA's mark was incontestable, and the district court found that the
USPS stamp art products did incorporate a perforated border similar to
ISA's mark. Accordingly, the question was whether the USPS's use
of
179
the perforated border was permissible as a "fair use" of ISA's mark.
A fair use defense is established if a defendant proves that its use of
the mark is: "'(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and
(3) in good faith.'"'
In essence, the fair use defense prevents a
trademark owner from appropriating a descriptive term for its exclusive
use, thereby preventing others from accurately describing a characteristic of their goods.'
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia granted summary judgment in USPS's favor on the
basis of fair use, finding that the USPS had used the disputed border
but that it had used it "'other than as a mark, in a descriptive manner,
and in good faith.'' 1 2 ISA appealed the grant of summary judgment,
arguing that the district court erred in finding no genuine issue of
material fact as to the USPS's good faith in using the border.'83
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it "ha[d] not yet
established a legal standard for good faith for purposes of a fair use
defense in the context of trademark infringement.""
The court then
agreed with its sister circuits that had concluded that the standard for
good faith for fair use was the same as the legal standard for good faith

177. Id. at 1273.
178. Id. at 1274 (quoting Gift of Learning Found., Inc. v. TGC, Inc., 329 F.3d 792, 797
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc.,
228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000)).
181. Id. (citing Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980)).
182. Id. at 1273.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1274.
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in any other trademark infringement context, which asked "whether the
alleged infringer intended to trade on the good will of the trademark
owner
by creating confusion as to the source of the goods or servic18 5
es."
In applying this standard to the facts at issue, the Eleventh Circuit
first observed that the overwhelming majority of stamps produced by the
USPS had long included perforated edges, and that the images of those
stamps that were copyrighted and licensed by the USPS included the
perforated edge when the original stamps were produced."8 6 The USPS
also provided affirmative evidence of good faith by showing that it
prominently placed its own familiar "eagle" and other trademarks on the
back of its stamp art products, thereby identifying them as USPS
On the
products rather than the products of ISA or anyone else.187
contrary, there was no evidence that the USPS had created any card
that added a perforated border to the image of one of the few stamps it
had produced without any perforations; that the USPS, by depicting its
stamps' edges as part of the image of each stamp, intended to create
confusion as to the source of its stamp art cards; or that the USPS
sought to mislead or confuse consumers into thinking that the source of
the cards it produced was ISA or anyone other than USPS. s
Although ISA argued that "a fair use analysis need not stop at
whether the subsequent user intended to trade on the goodwill of the
trademark owner," ISA failed to articulate what further inquiry, relevant
to trademark law, ought to be pursued."8 9 ISA also argued that the
USPS had a noninfringing, commercially viable alternative (i.e., to
produce cards depicting the stamp art alone, rather than the image of
the entire stamp, which included the perforated edge) and that the
USPS's failure to employ this alternative raised a fact issue as to its
good faith.' 9° Disagreeing with ISA, the Eleventh Circuit held that
this was not a "true alternative" because it did not provide USPS with
an alternative manner of depicting its stamps, but rather prevented the
USPS from depicting the stamp images at all. 19' This argument also

185. Id. at 1274-75 (citing EMI Catalogue,228 F.3d at 66; Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc.
v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (3d Cir. 1991); Zatarains,
Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983); Packman v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 642 (7th Cir. 2001); Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software,
Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1984)).
186. Id. at 1275.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1273, 1275.
189. Id. at 1275.
190. Id. at 1276.
191. Id.
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failed to account for the fact that that the USPS may not be able to
employ the stamp art alone in instances where the copyright to the
underlying art was held by another."
The court further concluded
that the USPS's failure to consult counsel prior to producing cards
depicting its stamps did not constitute evidence of bad faith because the
USPS was entitled to use 19the perforated border descriptively, as part of
the image of its products.'

Finally, ISA argued that the USPS acted in bad faith because it had
knowledge of ISA's registration of the mark, had been warned about its
infringing cards, and had deliberately misappropriated ISA's concept of
selling paper products containing the image of postage stamps.' 94
Although the court agreed that knowledge, under certain circumstances,
could raise a fact issue as to good faith, it concluded that "knowledge
alone, in the context of a nontrademark, descriptive use-particularly
when there was affirmative evidence of an intent not to confuse," was
insufficient to raise a fact issue.' 95 The court further noted that
trademark law did not protect against misappropriation of business
concepts, and although this evidence may raise an issue as to good faith
in business relations, this case was best understood by placing the
emphasis on the uncontested fact that the USPS's use of the perforated
border in its postage stamp greeting cards involved a nontrademark use
of ISA's mark."
As such,
the USPS's use of ISA's mark could not
197
constitute infringement.

V. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL

A. Whether a Debtor's Failureto Timely Disclose PotentialTruth in
Lending Act Claims as Contingent Assets in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
Amounts to Taking of Inconsistent Positions Within Meaning of
JudicialEstoppel Doctrine
The appeal in Ajaka v. BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corp.'98 required
the court to determine whether the debtor and plaintiff Temidayo Ajaka
should be judicially estopped from asserting claims for rescission and
damages under the Truth In Lending Act ("TILA")'" against his

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1276-77.
Id. at 1277.
453 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000).
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mortgagee, BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corporation ("BrooksAmerica"), and
the alleged assignees of his mortgage as a result of Ajaka's failure to
timely disclose his TILA claims as contingent assets in his pending
Chapter 13. bankruptcy proceeding.2" Ajaka obtained a loan from
BrooksAmerica on April 14, 2000, which was secured by a second
mortgage on his home.2 ' Two years later, on August 2, 2002, Ajaka
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia. °2 The court noted
that "under Chapter 13, a creditor has 180 days to object to confirmation
of the reorganization plan on the basis of fraud. "2 1 Ajaka was not
aware of any potential TILA claim arising out of his loan at the time he
filed for bankruptcy or at the time his Chapter 13 Reorganization Plan
was confirmed on December 7, 2002.20 4
Ajaka did not become aware of his potential TILA claim until January
3, 2003, when he met for the first time with a new attorney who
represented him in connection with his TILA claims and ultimately on
appeal. The attorney informed Ajaka at their first meeting that his
bankruptcy schedules would have to be amended to disclose the TILA
claim as an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding. Two weeks later, on
January 18, 2003, Ajaka's counsel sent a rescission demand on Ajaka's
behalf to BrooksAmerica, the original holder of Ajaka's note and security
deed.20 5
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1635(b),"' BrooksAmerica was
required to respond within twenty days after receipt of the demand,
which it did by advising Ajaka on or around February 13, 2003, that it
had assigned its interest in Ajaka's note and security deed to another
company.2 7 Ajaka claimed that BrooksAmerica never notified him of
the assignment of his note and security deed, and because the deed
records did not show any assignments, Ajaka claimed that neither he nor
his counsel could immediately determine the assignee against whom the
TILA claim should be asserted. Ajaka also claimed that his counsel

200. Ajaka, 453 F.3d at 1342-44.
201. Id. at 1342.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000)).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 15 U.S.C. §1635(b) (2000).
207. Ajaka, 453 F.3d at 1342. BrooksAmerica did not identify the entity to whom
Ajaka's mortgage had been assigned, but BrooksAmerica did state that it had provided
Ajaka with the proper TILA disclosures and that Ajaka did not have the right to rescind.
Id. at 1342-43.
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requested the name of the assignee from BrooksAmerica in a follow-up
communication but never received a response. °8
On or about March 26, 2003, Ajaka's counsel informed Ajaka's
bankruptcy lawyer that a TILA claim should be listed as a potential
asset in Ajaka's bankruptcy proceeding."' Two days later, convinced
that either Residential Funding Corporation ("RFC") or Homecomings
Financial Network, Inc. ("Homecomings") had taken assignment of
Ajaka's mortgage, Ajaka's counsel sent a statutory rescission demand to
RFC. ° On April 11, 2003, Ajaka filed suit alleging TILA violations
against the defendants, BrooksAmerica, RFC, and Homecomings, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.2 1'
On April 21, 2003, which was still within the 180-day time period for
creditors to object to confirmation of Ajaka's reorganization plan, RFC
filed a declaratory judgment action in Ajaka's bankruptcy proceeding,
alleging, among other things, that the TILA claim was barred by judicial
estoppel.2 1 2 On June 20, 2003, after the 180-day time period expired,
Ajaka filed a formal amendment to his bankruptcy action that disclosed
his TILA claim as a contingent asset.21 ' The defendants subsequently
moved for summary judgment in Ajaka's TILA action, arguing that
Ajaka's TILA claim was barred by judicial estoppel because he failed to
timely disclose it as an asset in his bankruptcy proceeding. The district
court granted the summary judgment motions and Ajaka appealed.214
Disagreeing with the district court's findings, the Eleventh Circuit
first noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which was meant to
preclude parties from "'asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is
inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding,"
is "'an equitable concept intended to prevent the perversion of the
judicial process.' 2 15 Therefore, the court determined that it must
"'take into account all of the circumstances of [the] case'" before applying

208. Id. at 1343.
209. Id.
210. Id. RFC received the demand letter on April 2 and was required to respond to the
demand within twenty days of receipt. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. RFC had not been served with the summons and complaint in Ajaka's TILA
action at the time it filed its declaratory judgment action. Id.
213. Id. The amendments also reclassified the mortgage from a secured debt to an
unsecured debt, assuming Ajaka was successful on his TILA claim. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1344 (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
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judicial estoppel to bar a claim.2 16 The court began with a consideration of two primary factors in determining whether to apply judicial
estoppel-"'[flirst, the allegedly inconsistent positions must have been
taken under oath in a prior proceeding, and second, they must have been
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system."'2 17 Although the
court noted that these factors were not "inflexible or exhaustive," it
noted that one pertinent factor was "'whether the present position is
clearly inconsistent with the earlier position and whether the party
successfully persuaded a court to accept the earlier position, so that
judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position in a218later proceeding
creates the perception that either court was misled.'
As to the first prong of the judicial estoppel analysis, the court
determined that there was "no question that Ajaka failed to timely
amend his Chapter 13 reorganization plan to reflect his contingent TILA
claim and that he therefore 'took inconsistent positions ... under oath
in a prior proceeding.'"219 The court stated that application of the
doctrine rested on Ajaka's intent-if Ajaka's failure to timely incorporate
the TILA claim into his bankruptcy proceeding was "'calculated to make
a mockery of the judicial system,"' then judicial estoppel should bar him
from taking advantage of the TILA claim in the district court.2 2 0
In evaluating Ajaka's intent to manipulate the judicial system, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that although the party invoking judicial estoppel
was not required to show prejudice, prejudice did serve an important role
in determining whether the doctrine should apply.22 Noting that the
purpose of judicial estoppel was to stop litigants from deliberately
changing positions after the fact to gain an unfair advantage, the court
pointed out that RFC's adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court,
which was filed in response to Ajaka's rescission demand, put all of
Ajaka's creditors, including the defendants, on notice of Ajaka's potential

216. Id. (quoting Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1307
n.16 (l1th Cir. 2005)).
217. Id. (quoting Palmer, 404 F.3d at 1307 n.16).
218. Id. (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285-86; citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532
U.S. 742, 751 (2001) (holding that "[a] third consideration is whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not estopped")).
219. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7)

(2000)).
220. Id. at 1345. "When considering a party's motive and intent and whether it
justifies applying judicial estoppel, we require that the intent be 'cold manipulation and
not an unthinking or confused blunder.'" Id. at 1345 n.7 (quoting Johnson Serv. Co. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175 (5th Cir. 1973)).
221. Id. at 1345 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286).
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TILA claim.222 In other words, although Ajaka did not amend his
bankruptcy schedules to reflect the TILA claim until after the 180-day
period under § 1330(a) had expired, all of Ajaka's creditors were already
aware of the TILA claim and therefore could have challenged Ajaka's
failure to previously amend his schedule within the context of the
ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. 2' The court also held that there was
significant evidence that Ajaka did not intend to conceal his TILA claim
from his creditors, and that Ajaka's counsel had informed his bankruptcy
attorney that the schedules should be amended to reflect the TILA
claims before any of the defendants raised the issue of judicial estoppel. 224 Because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
Ajaka had the motivation and intent to manipulate the judicial system,
the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants.225

222. Id.
[Tihere is no question that, due to RFC's filing, all of the creditors were on notice
of the potential TILA claim by April 21, 2003, if not before. As such, all of Ajaka's
creditors had more than six weeks from the time they learned of his TILA claim
to the expiration of the 180-day period for objecting to confirmation of his Chapter
13 reorganization plan and, if they so desired, seeking conversion of Ajaka's
bankruptcy from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.
Id. at 1343.
223. Id. at 1345. The court distinguished its decision in Burnes, where the debtor filed
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition six months before he filed a discrimination charge with
the EEOC against his employer, which, unlike the situation in Ajaka, was not a party to
the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. In that case, "almost one year later, but while his
bankruptcy remained pending, the debtor filed an employment discrimination suit against
his employer in federal district court. The debtor did not amend his bankruptcy schedules
or statement of financial affairs to include this lawsuit," later converted his bankruptcy
case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, and again failed to include the pending discrimination
suit on his amended schedules. Id. The debtor subsequently received a "no asset"
discharge. Id. However, "[nleither the Chapter 7 trustee, nor any of the-debtor's creditors,
ever knew about the employment discrimination lawsuit." Id. The'distirict court granted
the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the creditors relied on the debtor's
disclosure statements in determining whether to consent to the no asset discharge, and the
bankruptcy courts relied on the accuracy of these disclosure statements when considering
whether to approve the no asset discharge. Id. at 1345-46 (citing Burnes, 291 F.3d at
1286).
224. Id. at 1346. Although the bankruptcy attorney inexplicably delayed in amending
the schedules, he ultimately amended the schedules to include the TILA claim about three
months after being advised to do so and less than two months after the TILA lawsuit was
filed. Id.
225. Id.
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WAIVER

A. Whether an Employee's Failureto Object to a Union Representative's Alleged Bias Before an Administrative Grievance PanelResults
in a Waiver of the Issue in a Subsequent Lawsuit
In Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc.,22 ' as a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee's failure to raise an
objection to a union representative's alleged bias and bad faith before an
administrative grievance panel constituted a waiver of the employee's
right to raise that issue in a subsequent claim or on appeal." 7
Plaintiff Amadeo Bianchi's employment was terminated after thirty-six
years as a tractor-trailer driver for the defendant, Roadway Express, Inc.
("Roadway"). Bianchi was a long-time member of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 390 (the "Union"), and he had served
as a union steward and was very active in union politics. Bianchi was
fired for fraud and dishonesty when Roadway determined that he helped
another employee file a fraudulent injury report. After Bianchi was
discharged, he filed a grievance regarding his discharge and was
represented at the local and panel grievance hearings by the Union's
business agent for Roadway, Don Marr.228
Marr and Bianchi had a long history of political and personal
animosity, and Bianchi had filed several complaints against Marr and
the union leadership over the years. However, at the close of his
grievance panel hearing, Bianchi represented to the panel, which was
comprised of two Union members and two Roadway representatives, that
Marr had represented him properly and fully and that Marr had
presented all of the evidence in his favor. Bianchi never expressed to
the panel any reservations that he may have had about Marr's bias or
the bias of any panelist.229
After the panel upheld his termination, Bianchi filed a hybrid action
against Roadway under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
also known as the Taft-Hartley Act,230 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. 2 1 Bianchi also asserted
claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and sued
the Union for breaching its duty of fair representation ("DFR"), claiming

226. 441 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
227. Id. at 1279.
228. Id. at 1279-80.
229. Id. at 1279-81.
230. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
231. Bianchi, 441 F.3d at 1279.
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that the Union, through Marr, mishandled his grievance based on
political and personal animosity and in retaliation for Bianchi's
membership in a dissident union organization.2" 2 Bianchi claimed that
"Marr's hostility towards him caused Marr to represent him at his
grievance panel
hearing in bad faith and in an arbitrary and discrimina2 33
manner."
tory
Before trial, Roadway filed a motion in limine claiming that Bianchi
had waived his argument that Marr was biased by failing to raise this
issue before the grievance panel.2" The district court denied the
motion and the case proceeded to trial, where a jury found that Roadway
had fired Bianchi in violation of its CBA and that the Union, through
Marr, had represented Bianchi arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad
faith, or all three, at Bianchi's grievance hearing in breach of its
DFR.2"5 Although Roadway moved for judgment as a matter of law,
renewing its contention that Bianchi had waived his bad faith or bias
argument, the district court denied the motion without explanation and
entered judgment for Bianchi in accordance with the jury verdict.3 6
Roadway appealed, contending that Bianchi, with full knowledge of all
the relevant facts, had waived any argument that Marr was biased or
had represented him in bad faith because Bianchi chose not to raise this
issue at the grievance panel before he received an adverse ruling from
the panel.237
On appeal, Bianchi contended that there was no waiver for two
reasons: first, although Bianchi admitted that he lied to the panel about
his satisfaction with Marr's representation, he claimed that his fear of
"'mak[ing] the union part of the panel mad' excused him from bringing
up the bias issue at his hearing."23 Second, Bianchi claimed that "he
did not realize Marr's bad faith until it 'dawned on him' after he lost the
panel hearing. "239 When asked at trial what made him believe he did
not get a fair hearing, Bianchi pointed to Marr's conduct at the hearing
and his suspicion in hindsight that the proceeding had been fixed from

232. Id.
233. Id. at 1282 (citing Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976)).
234. Id. at 1281.
235. Id. at 1279, 1281.
236. Id. at 1281.
237. Id. at 1279.
238. Id. at 1283. Bianchi also contended he had no reason to believe that the panel
was "fixed" before the date of the hearing and that, at best, he was only concerned about
one particular panelist, although the presence of that panelist did not cause him to believe
that he could not get a fair hearing. Id.
239. Id.
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the beginning. 24° However, prior to Bianchi's hearing, a coworker
241
informed Bianchi that Marr was only "pretending" to help him.
Bianchi later testified at trial that he had been uncomfortable with Marr
throughout, believing that Marr was only "acting" or "going through the
motions" of representing him.2 42 Bianchi also admitted that Marr's
preparation for the panel hearing left him worried about Marr's
advocacy as Marr refused to call live witnesses, refused to push for a
joint hearing with the employee that Bianchi allegedly assisted (whose
termination was overturned), and made numerous errors in preparation
of an exhibit packet that Bianchi allegedly caught and fixed prior to the
hearing. Despite these facts, Bianchi never asked for a different union
representative, and when a panel member asked Bianchi whether Marr
had represented him properly and fully, Bianchi replied in the affirmative.243
On appeal, the burden was on Roadway to prove waiver.2" To prove
this, Roadway had to show that Bianchi had "'full knowledge of the
fact[s]' underlying his bias claim." 245 Finding no Eleventh Circuit case
24
on point, Roadway principally relied on Early v. Eastern Transfer
and Hazard v.Southern Union Co. 247 in support of its argument that
Bianchi should not be allowed to sit silent on the bias issue and later
object to an adverse ruling on that basis. 2" In Early the First Circuit
refused to consider the bad faith or bias arguments of two hybrid § 301
plaintiffs against a union representative on the panel because of the
plaintiffs' "failure to have raised the issue of the [union representative's]
purported bias before the joint committee." 249 The court in Early
determined that "[i]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, we will

240. Id. at 1283-84. Bianchi likened his case to Achilli v. John J. Nissen Baking Co.,
989 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1993), where the First Circuit upheld a finding of bad faith against
a union in a hybrid § 301 case. Bianchi, 441 F:3d at 562. However, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that this case was inapplicable to the issue in Bianchi because it did not
address the issue of waiver (and indeed never used the word "waiver" or "estoppel"), but
rather discussed the DFR issue in the context of whether the evidence supported a finding
that the union breached its DFR. Id. at 1283, 1286 & n.1l.
241. Id. at 1280.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1280-81.
244. Id. at 1285 (citing Lambert v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 274 F.2d 685, 687-88 (5th
Cir. 1961)).
245. Id. (citing Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir.
1982)).
246. 699 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1983).
247. 275 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.R.I. 2003).
248. Bianchi, 441 F.3d at 1284.
249. Early, 699 F.2d at 558.
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not entertain a claim of personal bias where it could have been but was
not raised at the hearing to which it applies."2 5 In Hazard the Rhode
Island District Court applied this principle in a hybrid § 301 case to a
biased union representative in Marr's position and found that the
"[pilaintiff waived his argument that the union representative was
biased 'because plaintiff knew of the alleged bias at the time of an
arbitration proceeding and failed to raise the issue during that
proceeding.' 25 1
Agreeing with Roadway, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that by
remaining silent and by failing to raise the issue of bad faith or bias at
his panel hearing, Bianchi waived his right to raise that issue in his
district court action against Roadway.252 Concluding that Early was
persuasive, the court determined that the key to ruling on the waiver
issue was that all of the facts now argued to the court regarding Marr's
bias were known to Bianchi at the time of the grievance panel hearing,
and not only did Bianchi fail to raise the issue at that time, he
affirmatively represented to the panel that he had been "'properly
represented."'253
In rejecting Bianchi's arguments, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted the court's reasoning in Early that
"[w]hile it may be unpleasant to have to choose between possibly
alienating a decisionmaker in advance by objecting and waiving the
issue of bias, we cannot accept that parties have a right to keep two
strings in their bow-to seek victory before the tribunal and then,
having lost, seek to overturn it for bias never before claimed."254
Finally, the court concluded that Bianchi's second rationale of
"hindsight" was not supported by the record, which reflected that Marr's
personal and political animosity, suggesting bad faith and bias, were
well known to Bianchi before the adverse decision by the grievance
panel, and that Bianchi learned and was advised before the panel
hearing that Marr was allegedly "fixing the hearing against him and
only going through the motions of helping him."255 As a result, the
court determined that Bianchi "'made a calculated decision not to object
to the alleged bias'" and, "[iln doing so, he lost the right to keep two

250. Id.
251. Hazard,275 F. Supp. 2d at 225 n.13.
252. Bianchi, 441 F.3d at 1279.
253. Id. at 1285 (quoting Early, 699 F.2d at 558).
254. Id. (quoting Early, 699 F.2d at 558). "If a Union member fails to utilize the
grievance procedure under the CBA to air his grievances, then a district court should not
allow him to make such arguments for the first time." Id. (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976)).
255. Id. at 1286.
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strings in his bow."2 56
Determining that Bianchi had waived his
objection of bad faith or bias by failing to raise it before his grievance
panel, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding
that the union had breached its DFR, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
jury verdict in favor of Bianchi and granted Roadway's judgment as a
25 7
matter of law.
B. Whether the EquitableDoctrine of In Pari Delicto Can Bar a
Bankruptcy Trustee From Recovering on RICO Claims Against a
Debtor's Alleged Co-Conspirators
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards,258 the court had to determine, as an issue of first impression in
the Eleventh Circuit, whether the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto,
which provides that "a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing may
not recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing,"2 59 can bar a
trustee's claims on behalf of a bankrupt debtor for violations of the
Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 260 Holding that the defense of in pari delicto does bar recovery
by a central and active violator of RICO, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the trustee's complaint.2 6'
Daryl S. Laddin served as the trustee in bankruptcy for the debtor,
ETS Pay Phones, Inc. ("ETS"), a company that operated a massive Ponzi
scheme that defrauded thousands of investors out of hundreds of
millions of dollars.2 62 Laddin filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting RICO, aiding and
abetting, and avoidance claims against the defendants, who were several
large holders of individual retirement accounts, alleging that the
defendants aided ETS in defrauding investors by funneling investor IRA
funds into ETS investments. 2 '
The defendants moved to dismiss

256. Id. (citing Swift Indep. Packing Co. v. Dist. Union Local One, United Food &
Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 575 F. Supp. 912, 916 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Early, 699 F.2d
at 558).
257. Id.
258. 437 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 2006).
259.

BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 806 (8th ed. 2004).

260. Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1148 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2000)). The court also had to determine whether the trustee could maintain a claim for
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duties under Georgia law. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. Laddin claimed that "'by failing to conduct appropriate due diligence and/or
ignoring the facts altogether,'" the defendants "'enabled thousands of investors to partake
of the ETS scheme and caused ETS to incur millions of dollars in additional debt.'" Id.
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Laddin's complaint, arguing inter alia that the doctrine of in pari delicto
barred Laddin's claims. 2" The district court agreed and granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss, finding in pertinent part that as a result
of ETS's wrongdoing, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Laddin's
claims against ETS's alleged co-conspirators because the "'legal and
equitable interests of the debtor' in bankruptcy are only as strong as the
debtor's claim against defendants at the commencement of the bankruptcy."26 Laddin appealed the dismissal.266
1. The Trustee Is Subject to All Defenses that Were Available
Against the Debtor. Affirming the district court's findings, the
Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether a bankruptcy trustee was
subject to an in pari delicto defense that might have been asserted
against the debtor.267 Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that the trustee had standing to bring claims based on
alleged injuries to the debtor estate,2" the debtor's wrongdoing was
still relevant to the claims that the trustee could assert.269 Laddin
contended that because the doctrine of in pari delicto depends on the
"'personal malfeasance of the individual seeking to recover,'" the debtor's
wrongs should not be imputed to him as the bankruptcy trustee.27 °
In support of his position, Laddin cited the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code which explained that "[t]o the extent... an interest
is limited in the hands of the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands
of the estate except to the extent that defenses which are personal
against the debtor are not effective against the estate."2 71 However,

264. Id. at 1148-49. The Eleventh Circuit held that it need not reach the issue of
whether the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Laddin's aiding and abetting claims because
Georgia courts did not recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duties in the first place. Id. at 1156-57 (citing Munford, Inc. v. Valuation
Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 613 (11th Cir. 1996); Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 659, 664, 602 S.E.2d 219, 224 (2004) (holding that "Georgia has never
recognized a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.")).
265. Id. at 1149 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. "A trustee, as the representative of the estate, succeeds into the rights of the
debtor-in-bankruptcy and has standing to bring any suit that the debtor corporation could
have brought outside of bankruptcy." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2000); O'Halloran v. First
Union Natl Bank, 350 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2003)).
269. Id. at 1149-50. "[An analysis of standing does not include an analysis of
equitable defenses, such as in pari delicto.'" Id. at 1149 (citing Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2001)).
270. Id. at 1150.
271. Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)).
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the court determined that it was unnecessary to resort to legislative
history because under the plain, unambiguous meaning of § 541(a), the
debtor estate includes all "'legal or equitable interest of the debtor [. ..
as of the commencement of the case. '' 2 72 Noting nothing in the text of
the Bankruptcy Code that the trustee acquired rights or interests
greater than those of the debtor, the court held that if the debtor's claim
would have been subject to an in pari delicto defense at the commencement of the bankruptcy, then that same claim, when asserted by the
trustee, is subject to the same defense.273
The court also. disagreed with the trustee's argument "that his
recovery would ultimately inure to the benefit of innocent creditors
instead of the wrongful debtor."274 Specifically, the court determined
that Laddin's argument ignored the likelihood that individual creditors
damaged by the debtor's Ponzi scheme could separately pursue claims
against the defendants outside of the bankruptcy and free from the bar
of in pari delicto.275 If the trustee was allowed to pursue the debtor's
claims, his recovery would become part of the bankruptcy estate to be
apportioned among all of the debtor's creditors, without regard to
whether they were harmed by the defendants.276 In contrast, if the
creditors sued the defendants separately and outside of bankruptcy,
those creditors would not risk a dilution of their recovery through
apportionment
to senior creditors or unharmed creditors of equal
2 77
priority.
Although this was an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,
the court noted that it was "not alone in concluding that the defense of
in pari delicto may be asserted against a bankruptcy trustee" and that

272. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)). The court determined that the trustee's argument
would fail even if legislative history was considered because the portion of the legislative
history quoted by the trustee was inapplicable to the interpretation of "'property of the
debtor estate'" under § 541(a). Id.
273. Id. (citing O'Halloran, 350 F.3d at 1202; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (2004 &
Supp. 2006)). The court also held its reading of§ 541(a) to be consistent with the purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for an automatic stay freezing the rights of parties
to the bankruptcy, both debtor and creditors, upon the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. Id. at 1150-51. Under the trustee's erroneous interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 541, the
court determined that a postpetition event such as the appointment of a trustee could
undermine the automatic stay and alter the nature of the legal and equitable interests of
the debtor estate. Id.
274. Id. at 1151.
275. Id.
276. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507, 1129(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2006)).
277. Id. In other words, creditors whose legal interests were actually harmed by the
defendants could rightfully recover more outside of the bankruptcy because they would not
compete with the trustee's claims on behalf of the debtor estate. Id.
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its sister circuits had unanimously concluded that in pari delicto applies
with equal force to a trustee-in-bankruptcy and a debtor outside of
bankruptcy. 278 Against this weight of authority, Laddin erroneously
relied, inter alia, on a Seventh Circuit decision that applied in pari
delicto to bar recovery for a receiver who brought a fraudulent conveyance action under Illinois law.279 However, determining that Laddin's
appeal was governed by the Bankruptcy Code, not by the law of
receiverships or fraudulent conveyances under state law, the Eleventh
Circuit held:
Both the text and the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code support the
conclusion of the district court that Laddin's complaint is subject to the
same defenses that were available against a complaint filed by the
debtor at the commencement of the bankruptcy. "The equitable
defense of in pari delicto is available in an action by a bankruptcy
trustee against another party if the defense could have been raised
against the debtor."28
2. The Doctrine of In Pari Delicto Bars a RICO Claim by a
Conspirator. Having held that the equitable defense of in paridelicto
is available in an action by a bankruptcy trustee, the court turned to yet
another issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: whether the in
pari delicto defense bars a complaint under RICO.28 ' First noting that
"[tihere is a paucity of federal caselaw regarding whether the doctrine
of in pari delicto bars a complaint under RICO, and none of our sister
circuits have squarely decided the issue," the court looked to two United
States Supreme Court cases that had considered the application of the
in pari delicto doctrine in antitrust and securities cases.28 2 The court
first looked to Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.,253
which appeared to preclude the use of in pari delicto against a federal
RICO claim because the Supreme Court had held "'that the doctrine of

278. Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 158-66 (2d Cir. 2003); R.F.Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d at 356-57;
Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997); Grassmueck
v. Am. Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2005); Sender v. Buchanan (In re
Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996)).
279. Id. (citing Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995)).
280. Id. at 1152 (quoting Grassmueck, 402 F.3d at 836).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1152-53.
283. 392 U.S. 134 (1968), overruled on different grounds by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, 28and effects, is not to be
recognized as a defense to an antitrust action.' 4
The plaintiffs in Perma Life Mufflers were franchisees who alleged
that their franchisor had conspired with other individuals and entities
to restrain trade and engage in illegal price discrimination.2 85 However, the Supreme Court held that the franchisees were, at worst, "passive
violators" of the antitrust laws and reasoned that because "in pari delicto
literally means 'of equal fault,' the doctrine should not deny recovery to
injured parties merely because they have participated to the extent of
utilizing illegal arrangements formulated and carried out by others."286
Because the franchisees' participation in the alleged antitrust conspiracy
was not voluntary in any meaningful sense, the Supreme Court held
that the in pari delicto doctrine did not bar the franchisees from
recovery, although the Court explicitly left open the question whether
complete involvement in an antitrust violation, "wholly apart from the
idea of in pari delicto," would bar a plaintiff from bringing an antitrust
claim.28 7
In its later decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner,28 8 the Supreme Court also refused to apply the doctrine of in
paridelicto to bar the tippee-plaintiffs from recovery for insider trading
under federal securities laws.28 9 In Bateman Eichler, the tippees
alleged that a securities broker and company official had induced them
to purchase company stock by providing them with materially false
insider information, and that they suffered damages when a stock price
fell as a result of the false information. 29° As in Perma Life Mufflers,
the Supreme Court concluded that in paridelicto would not apply to bar
the tippees' claims because the tippees were not active participants in
the alleged violations of federal law.291 The Court explained that "[in
its classic formulation, the in pari delicto defense was narrowly limited
to situations where the plaintiff
truly bore at least substantially equal
292
responsibility for his injury.
Based on the holdings in Perma Life Mufflers and Bateman Eichler,
the Eleventh Circuit held that "the application of the defense of in pari
delicto to causes of action created by federal statutes depends on two

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1153 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 140).
Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 135.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
472 U.S. 299 (1985).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 301-02.
See id.
Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306-07.

1354

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

factors: (1) the plaintiffs' active participation in the violation vel non
and (2) the policy goals of the federal statute."293 The court further
noted that both of those factors supported the application of the in pari
delicto defense with respect to Laddin's RICO claims.2 94 First, the
court determined that it was "beyond doubt" that the allegations
contained in Laddin's complaint rendered ETS in active participation
with the defendants, and in fact the principal wrongdoer in the fraudulent Ponzi scheme.295
Moreover, federal RICO violations require
affirmative wrongdoing rather than passive acquiescence as a matter of
law.29
This "logically compel[led] the conclusion that ETS had
'substantially equal responsibility for [its] [injury].'" 297
Second, the court determined that applying in pari delicto to bar the
trustee's complaint advanced the policy of civil liability under the federal
RICO statute-to help eradicate organized crime by divesting the
association of the fruits of ill-gotten gains.298 In the instant case, the
trustee's recovery under RICO would not divest the RICO violators of
their ill-gotten gains, but rather would result in a simple wealth transfer
among similarly situated co-conspirators. 299 Because ETS was an
active participant in the fraudulent scheme, the court concluded that
application of the defense of in pari delicto furthered the policy of the
federal RICO statutes, and accordingly held that because a complaint
brought by ETS against other members of its RICO conspiracy, outside
of bankruptcy, would have been barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto,
the trustee was likewise barred from recovery within bankruptcy."' °
VII.

CONCLUSION

The 2006 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, many of
which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.

293. Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1154 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1988)).
294. Id. at 1154-55.
295. Id. at 1155.
296. Id. at 1155-56. "Perma Life Mufflers explicitly left open the possibility that a
defense of active involvement could bar a complaint about an antitrust conspiracy, and our
sister circuits have accordingly barred antitrust claims where the plaintiff was completely
involved in the antitrust conspiracy." Id. at 1156 (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 1155 (quoting Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 308-09).
298. Id. (citing Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899,910 (3d Cir. 1991)). "The
doctrine of in pari delicto is based on the policy that 'courts should not lend their good
officers to mediating disputes among wrongdoers[,]' and 'denying judicial relief to an
admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality.'" Id. at 1152 (quoting
Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306).
299. Id. at 1155.
300. Id. at 1156.
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While this survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have
attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by
providing relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and
procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

